Librería Samer Atenea
Librería Aciertas (Toledo)
Kálamo Books
Librería Perelló (Valencia)
Librería Elías (Asturias)
Donde los libros
Librería Kolima (Madrid)
Librería Proteo (Málaga)
The publication of the 1982 version of Army FieldManual (FM) 100-5, Operations, introduced to theEnglish-speaking world the idea of an operational levelof war which encompassed the planning and conductof campaigns and major operations. It was followed 3years later by the introduction of the term 'operationalart' which was, in practice, the skillful managementof the operational level of war. This conception ofan identifiably separate level of war that definedthe jurisdiction of the profession of arms was, for anumber of historical and cultural reasons, attractive toU.S. practitioners and plausible to its English-speakingallies. As a result, it and its associated doctrine spreadrapidly around the world.This monograph argues that the idea of anoperational level of war charged with the planning andconduct of campaigns misconceives the relationshipbetween wars, campaigns, and operations, and is bothhistorically mistaken and wrong in theory. BrigadierJustin Kelly (Australian Army Retired) and Dr. MichaelBrennan conclude that its incorporation into U.S.doctrine has had the regrettable impact of separatingthe conduct of campaigns from the conduct of warsand consequently marginalized the role of politics inthe direction of war. In essence, they argue that theidea of the campaign has come to overwhelm that ofstrategy.This monograph argues that as warfare continues todiffuse across definitional and conceptual boundariesand as the close orchestration of all of the instrumentsof national power becomes even more important,the current conception of campaigns and operationsbecomes crippling. To cope with these demands byformulating and prosecuting 'national campaigns,'the authors propose that the responsibility forcampaign design should 'actually' return to thepolitical-strategic leadership of nations supported bythe entirety of the state bureaucracy. This would markthe return of the campaign to its historical sources. Ifthe United States and its allies fail to make this change,they risk continuing to have a 'way of battle' ratherthan a 'way of war.'
